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QUESTION FOR REVIEW
DID

THE

COURT

OF

APPEALS

DISREGARD

FACTS

AND

OTHERWISE IGNORE STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW IN REACHING
ITS OPINION?

REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at
74

Ut.

Adv.

Rep.

35

(Ct. App.

1988)

(copy

attached

as

Exhibit A ) .

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The decision being reviewed was entered on January
28,

1988.

Gleave's

February 10, 1988.
1988.

Petition

for

Rehearing

was

filed

on

The Petition was denied on February 22,

By order of March 15, 1988, this court extended the

time for filing the Petition for Certiorari to April 5, 1988
(copy attached as Exhibit B ) .
Jurisdiction

of

this court

is conferred

by Utah

Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Amended 1986).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980); Little
America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112 (Utah 1982).

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
Gleave

was

injured

in

an

auto-train

collision.

Gleave sued Denver & Rio Grande (hereafter Rio Grande) on the
theory that the crossing was dangerous.

The jury returned a

verdict that Gleave was 0 percent negligent and Rio Grande
was 100 percent negligent.

The jury made a substantial award

of compensatory damages.
Gleave also claimed punitive damages.

After all

evidence was received, the court directed a verdict removing
punitive damages from the case.
Gleave* appealed from the trial court's ruling on
punitive damages.2

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT REFUSED TO CONSTRUE THE FACTS IN
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO GLEAVE
Rio Grande made the motion for a directed verdict
on punitive damages.

On that issue, Gleave was the losing

L

h more detailed factual analysis is included at Point
One of the argument. Photocopies of the record are appended
to this brief so that the court can verify the substance of
the citation.
^Rio Grande appealed on other grounds.

2

party.

The

Court

of Appeals

clearly

understood

the ap-

propriate standard of review:
In reviewing the correctness of the trial
court's grant of a directed verdict to
Rio Grande on Gleave's punitive damage
claim, we must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to him, the party
against whom the motion was made. Kim v.
Anderson, 610 P.2d
1270, 1271 (Utah
1980).
If there is no evidence to
justify punitive damages, the issue was
properly withheld from the jury.
Tripp
v. Baqley, 75 Utah 42, 282 P. 1026
(1929).
If, however,
reasonable
inferences supporting judgment for the
losing party could be drawn from the
evidence presented at trial, the directed
verdict cannot be sustained.
Little
America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d
112, 114 (Utah 1982); Kim, 610 P.2d at
1271.
This is so even if reasonable
persons might reach different conclusions
on the punitive damage issue after
considering
the
evidence
and
the
reasonable inferences therefrom.
See
Little America Refining Co., 641 P.2d at
114.
74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at p.41.
The problem is that the Court of Appeals mouthed
the words, but then did exactly the opposite.

A.

Near Misses.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals

plaintiff

had offered no evidendce of

Ut. Adv. Rep. at p. 41.)
true.

states that

"near misses."

(74

However, that statement was not

There was significant evidence of "near misses."
3

(R.

1683-1686.)

In fact, there were eight prior "near misses."

(One car had two separate near misses.)

One of the "near

misses" involved a mother and her children.
Gleave
point.

filed

a

Petition

for

Rehearing

on

this

In response, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff Gleave filed with this court a
petition for reconsideration of whether
the trial court erred
in granting
Defendant
Rio Grande's motion
for
directed verdict on Gleave's punitive
damage claim.
In support of his
petition, Gleave correctly asserts that,
in evaluating the evidence on this point,
we took into consideration the absence of
any evidence of near misses at the
subject railroad crossing.
However, he
indicates in his petition--for the first
time — that his near-miss
and prior
accident evidence was excluded in a pretrial ruling.
Because Gleave did not
raise in his cross-appeal the issue of
wheth€5r the court erroneously excluded
his
proffered
near-miss
and
prior
accident evidence, we have not and will
not address that issue.

(See Exhibit C.)
It is true that neither party briefed the evidentiary

issue of

"near misses."

It was certainly

Gleave's

right--and Gleave's risk--to rely on other evidence, and to
ignore the

"near misses" evidence.

The Court of Appeals,

likewise, had every right to ignore the "near miss" evidence,
since it was not raised in the briefs.
However, the Court of Appeals chose to search the
record and to raise the issue of "near misses" sua sponte.
4

Gleave concedes that the Court of appeals had power to search
the record and raise issues sua sponte.

(See e.g. Swenson v.

Thibaut, 250 S.E.2d 279, 293 (N.C. 1978).

However, having

raised the issue, the Court of Appeals should have resolved
it!

Instead, after raising the issue sua sponte, the Court

of Appeals relied on a clearly erroneous ruling of the trial
court.

That

was

an

error

of

law

and

an

abdication

appellate jurisdiction.
We hold the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's action . . .
In passing
on this assignment of error, evidence
erroneously excluded is to be considered
with other evidence offered by plaintiffs. Woodward v. Pressley, 249 S.E.2d
471 (N.C. App. 1978).
•

*

*

In considering whether the trial court
should have sustained defendant's motions
for directed verdicts, this court will
look to all the competent evidence,
including facts which were shown by proof
but which were withdrawn from the jury by
the trial judge, especially where such
evidence was improperly withdrawn, as we
think was true in this case.
Beene v.
Cook, 311 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1957).
•

*

*

In passing on the sufficiency of the
evidence, we have considered that offered
by plaintiff and improperly excluded by
the court. Smith v. J.C. Penny Co., 149
N.W.2d 794 (Iowa 1967) .

5

of

B.

Prior Injuries.
The Court of Appeals opinion stresses that there

were no accidents at the crossing up to the time of UDOT's
inspection
p. 41.)

and evaluation

in 1974.

However, there were two accidents after that inspec-

tion, between 1974 and 1982.
serious injuries.
grazed.

C.

(74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at

One of those accidents involved

In the second accident, the car was only

(R. 1685.)

Temporary Stop Sign.
The Court stressed that Rio Grande had installed a

stop sign to improve safety until flashing lights could be
installed.

(74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at p.41.)

The Court of Appeals

supposed this was evidence of good faith.
However, there was evidence that the stop sign did
little or nothing to improve safety.

Before the stop sign

was installed, the Utah County Surveyor wrote:
It is also their feeling [County Road
Commission] that very few people will pay
attention to them [stop signs]. However,
it would place responsibility on the
driver if he violated the stop sign and
was involved in an accident.
(See plaintiff's Exhibit 12.)
From

this

letter,

a

jury

could

infer

that

Rio

Grande's purpose in placing the stop sign had nothing to do

6

with public safety.

Rather, Rio Grande's purpose was simply

to get some legal protection from lawsuits.
Rio Grande

knew that

the crossing

dangerous even with the stop sign.

remained very

(R. 1238-1241.)

Indeed,

there is evidence from which a jury could infer that the stop
sign made the crossing more dangerous.

(R. 1588-89, 1606.)

A jury might infer that to place a stop sign--and nothing
more—was

evidence

that

Rio

Grande

acted

in

reckless

Court of Appeals

stressed

disregard to public safety.

D.

Rural Locality,
The

opinion

of

the

". . . The locality was rural, and the road was not heavily
travelled."
crossing

is

(74 Ut. Adv.

Rep.

in the moderately

bears

p. 41.)

built-up

serves a residential subdivision.
8.)

at

area

In fact, the
of

town and

(See plaintiff's Exhibit

The jury could infer from the evidence that the road
a

children.

medium

amount

of

traffic--especially

women

and

Certainly, it is incorrect to regard this as a

"rural" crossing.

E.

Knowledge of Danger.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals stressed that,

"There is no evidence that Rio Grande knew or should have
7

known of the facts discovered by Gleave's expert
(74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at p.41.)

. . . "

Gleave concedes that punitive

damages should not lie if Rio Grande did not have knowledge
of the danger.
However, Rio Grande built the railroad and maintained it.

A jury could easily infer that the builder of the

railroad had actual knowledge of the danger.
railroad was reckless

If not, the

for building a railroad without any

thought or analysis of the public danger.
Moreover,

Gleave

respectfully

submits

that

the

Court of Appeals refused to consider the testimony of Joseph
Yuhas.

Yuhas worked for the State of Utah.

In 1975 (eight

years before the accident), Yuhas met with a representative
of

Rio

Grande

inspection.

at the crossing

to make

an official

Th€» purpose of the inspection was to inspect the

safety of the crossing, including warning
distance.

joint

signs and sight

(R. 1238.)
The specific findings of that inspection were:
The sight distance, alignment of track
and highway approach gradient, condition
of th€* road surface and condition of the
crossing are poor.

(R. 1241.)
Thus, Rio Grande knew as early as 1974 the specific
danger

at that crossing.

charge of all trackage

Also, Rio Grande's engineer in

travelled over
8

that specific

curve

between

once

years.

each week

(R.1329.)

and once each month

Finally,

this

specific

inspected by Rio Grande on a regular basis.

for over ten
crossing

was

(R. 1326.)

In short, there was abundant evidence from which a
jury could infer that Rio Grande had actual knowledge of the
danger.

F.

Highly Unreasonable Conduct.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals stressed that

there was

no extreme

departure

from

ordinary

care.

worst, the evidence shows errors of judgment . . .

in failing

to take steps to reduce the risks at this crossing."
Adv. Rep. at p. 19.)

"At

(74 Ut.

It is respectfully submitted that the

jury might see it otherwise.
One of plaintiff's experts testified that this was
the worst out of thousands of crossings he had inspected.
(74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at p. 37.)

Without more, a jury might find

that to be "highly unreasonable conduct."

Furthermore, it

would have been easy and cheap to improve safety.

All Rio

Grande had to do was light a match and burn the weeds which
obstructed vision.

(R. 1597.)

Next, this was not a case where Rio Grande overlooked

some

safety

procedures

at

a

single

intersection.

Rather, this is a case where Rio Grande completely ignores
9

automobile safety at every crossing in Utah as a matter of
policy.

Rio Grande has no rules or regulations with respect

to safety procedures for such blind crossings.

(R. 1333.)

For example, Rio Grande does not even consider such blind
crossings in setting train speeds.

(R. 1334.)

Indeed, Rio

Grande has no rules or regulations or standards at all with
respect to automobile safety.

(R. 1338o)

A jury might do more than find this to be "highly
unreasonable conduct."

A jury might be outraged.^

After

all, when a car and a train collide, the car never wins.

G.

Public Objectives,
The opinion of the Court of Appeals stated that,

"Gleave has not directed our attention to any public objective which

would

clearly

punitive damages herein."

be

accomplished

by

an

award

of

(74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at p.42.)

J

The failure to have any policy at all for automobilesafety is in direct conflict with the laws of this state.
The Court of Appeals has stated: "The statute relied upon by
Rio Grande does not relieve it of the duty to operate trains
with reasonable care, nor does it prohibit Rio Grande from
exercising reasonable care in the operation of its trains and
the maintenance of its right-of-way.
Rio Grande cannot
ignore the public peril at a more than ordinarily hazardous
crossing and excuse itself until UDOT takes action to upgrade
the safety devices at the 1600 South crossing.
Rio Grande
remains subject to a standard of care which, under the
circumstances of the crossing, could require actions to
reduce risks imposed on the public."
(74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at
p.36.)
10

It

is

respectfully

public objective.

submitted

that

there

is

a

The public objective is to protect the

public at all of the other railroad crossings in Utah.
There is evidence in this case that Rio Grande had
actual

knowledge

of

the

danger.

(See paragraph

E above.)

There is further evidence that Rio Grande has no rules or
regulations or standards at all with respect to automobile
safety.

(See paragraph F above.)

Thus, similar dangers may

be lurking at hundreds of other railroad crossings in Utah.
By permitting punitive damages now, lives may be
saved tomorrow!
Gleave cited numerous cases to the Court of Appeals
which squarely allow punitive damages in railroad crossing
cases.
The

(In fact, Rio Grande cited no cases to the contrary.)

basis

is

that

a public

objective

will

be

served

to

penalize a railroad for reckless disregard of public safety.
See, Poole v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 638 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.
1982); Hazelwood v. 111. Central Gulf R.R., 450 N.E.2d 1199
(111. App. 1983); Brown v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 703 F.2d
1050 (8th Cir. 1983); Matkovich v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 431 N.E.2d

652

(Ohio

1982); Stromquist v. Bur-

lington Northern, Inc., 444 N.E.2d

(111. App.

1983);

Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613 P.2d

982

1980);

Lowery

241

v.

Seabord

Coastline
11

R.R.

1113

Co.,

(Mont.
S.E.2d

158

(SoCal. 19 78); Estate of Clifton v. Southern Pacific Transp.,
686 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App. 1985).

POINT II
THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAN BE
TRIED SEPARATELY, AND THERE IS NO NEED
TO RETRY THE LIABILITY ISSUES
Gleave has received a jury verdict that he is 0
percent negligent and that Rio Grande is 100 percent negligent.
remand

The preferred procedure is to affirm that verdict and
for

damages.

the

sole

purpose

of

a new

trial

on

punitive

See e.g., Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. East Bay

Union of Mach. , 39 Cal. Rptr. 64

(1964), where the court

stated:
An appellate court has power to remand
cases for retrial on a single issue such
as damages (citations omitted), and this
power includes a retrial on the limited
issue of exemplary damages.
(citations
omitted),
Id. at p.100.

See also, Olin Corp. v. Dyson, 678 S.W.2d 650

(Tex. App. 1984); Alhino v. Starr, 169 Cal. Rptr. 136; 112
Cal. App. 3d 158 (1981); Rosner v. Sears Roebuck, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 237; 110 Cal. App. 3d 740 (1980).
Indeed, it is not uncommon to bifurcate the issues
of

compensatory

damages

and

punitive damages.

Rupert

v.

Sellers, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975); James D. Vollertson Assts.,
12

Inc. v, John Nothnaqle, Inc., 369 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1975); Newton
v. Yates, 353 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. App. 1976); Chupp v. Henderson, 216 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. 1975).

See also, Punitive Damages

Law & Practice, Callaghan 1984 Ed., §12.04.
damage claim

can be bifurcated

If the punitive

into a separate trial, it

follows a priori that remand for a trial on the limited issue
of punitive damages would be appropriate.

POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI IN ORDER
TO SUPERVISE THE CONDUCT OF AN INFERIOR COURT
Rule 4 3 of the Rules of

the Utah Supreme Court

states in part:
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there
are
special
and
important
reasons
therefore. The following . . . indicate
the character of reasons that will be
considered.
•

*

*

(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has rendered a decision that has so far
departed from the accepted course of
judicial proceedings . . . as to call for
the exercise of this Court's power of
supervision . . . .
In this case, the Court of Appeals made its own
inferences from the facts.
jury—not

the court.

However, that is the task of the

The standard of review required the
13

Court of AppeaLs to construe the facts
favorable to Gleave.
opposite.

in the light most

The Court of Appeals did exactly the

In every case, the facts were construed in the

light most favorable to Rio Grande.
This Court

should

grant

certiorari, not only to

correct the mistake, but to supervise the Court of Appeals in
correct appellate procedure for future cases.
DATED this

J

day of

((ftCtL\_

, 1988.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & AwSSOClATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By
'

14

,/ > y
ROBERT J. DEBRY

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

that

four

true

and

correct

copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
hand delivered this

O

(Gleave v. Rio Grande, et al. ) were
day of

([J^U.L

,

1988, to the

y
,J

following:
E. Scott Savage, Esq.
Michael F. Richman, Esq.
Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq.
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Rio Grande and Utah Railway Company
P.O. Box 3400
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Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utah
Department of Transportation, State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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1

supposed to do?

What were your instructions, other than

2

just looking at

3

A

4

the planking, condition of the rail, condition of the

5

highway, condition of existing facilities, such as advance

6

warning signs on the pavement, advance warning signs,

7

cross bucks, flashing lights, sight distance.

8

Q

9

inspection?

it?

Our instructions were to inspect the condition of

Was anyone else present at the time of the

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Who was present at that time?

12

A

According to -- this was ten years ago -- according

13

to my list there, there was, from our department, there was

14

Woodrow Burnham, there was myself, there was a member of

15

the Public Service Commission, Dean Hales, Mr. Dean Pitts

16

from the D&RG Railroad, Stewart Christensen.

17

Q

18

Did anybody tell you what his title was?

19

A

20

I did meet him.

21

Q

22

inspection took place.

23

or how does it work?

24

A

25

us how many crossings we were going to look at that day.

Do you know Mr. Dean Pitts from the D&RG Railroad?

No, no one told me what his title was, and yes,

At the time of the inspection tell us how the
Did you all walk around together,

Generally what we would do is Stewart would tell

Yuhas-D
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We had an informal checklist that he would make up copies,
enough for all of the people to have.

On this checklist

were several things, such as we would drive up to the
crossing, we would look for pavement markings on the street.
If there were any we would check yes or no.

If there were

any advance warning signs or so forth.
Q

Was the group all together as you went?

A

Generally, yes.

We would either go in one or two

cars, depending on how many people were there.

Sometimes

it was very hard to fit six adults in a car comfortably,
so sometimes we would take one car; sometimes we would take
two.
Q

You don't remember on this day whether you had one

or two cars?
A

No , I don ? t:.

Q

In any case, the group was walking together as you

walked?
A

Yes, we would approach the crossing and look for

particular items, then we would find a convenient or safe
spot to pull off the highway and then we would get together
as a group and each one would give his recommendations or
what they thought should be done.
Q

As you went through were there discussions back and

forth about the conditions of crossings?
A

Yes.

Yuhas-D
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Q

And at the conclusion of the meeting did you write -|

A

I did, yes.

Q

What were your recommendations at that time?

A

My recommendations were what is on that piece of

paper, and I couldn't tell you what that is unless I look
at the paper.
Q

Do you have any independent -- were the notes at

the time you made them true and accurate?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you make them on or about the time of the visit^

A

We would make them right there.

Q

And in what form did you make the notes?

A

I would generally have a clipboard with a particulaif

crossing on there and I would go from the checklist, plus
I had a notepad that I would write down any other informatiojn
or I would write it on that piece of paper.
Q

Showing you this, would that refresh your

recollection as to your findings on that date?
A

Yes.

Q

Tell the Court what your findings were.

A

This states:

"Crossing number one sixty-eight,

1420 South 190 East Springville, railroad milepost 695.41.
This crossing consists of one track.
accidents on this crossing.

There have been no

There are nine trains per day

with the vehicular traffic of three hundred thirty-nine

Yuhas-D
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1

.2y t r a f f i c . y[he

sight distance,

a l i g n m e n t of

2

track and highway approach gradient, condition of road

3

surface and condition of the crossing are poor.

4

Recommendations on this crossing include building up the

5

approach areas- to reduce critical grade, grading and paving
- i, hot,'. „ MiiExir-fiiBii' - •

6

r

9

j

,

; the^approlacheg and the crossing and installing ref lectorized

7
8

u

crjos&j bucksw|,,advancejiwarning .signs , pavement markings,
3i?A^a^ifiSkA4ightiSsi>gnals wi,th twenty,,thousand lumenaire
l^^^n^,ilrit^^itet,,i.iic^clienses Jdrlt

.^asferjurther recommended

10
11
12

Q

13

the other people present during the evaluation?

14

A

15

any other crossing we would discuss our findings together.

16

We were all in a group like you or I gathered around a table

17

there.

18

Q

19

and what form did you give this to your boss?

20

A

21

give it to oui secretary to type up.

22

Q

23

send out a copy of your findings to the other people on

24

the team?

25

A

Thank you.

Did you discuss that conclusion with

Yes, we did.

We would -- before we would leave for

And after you made the evaluation you went back,

It was in a handwritten form.

Then I would general!]y

At that time was it your custom and practice to

Generally it was, yes.

486.
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1

(Reading)

"Question:

State the name of the person,

2

firm or corporation or partnership which maintains the said

3

railroad right-of-way and maintains all railroad crossing

4

areas.

5

"Answer:

Denver & Rio Grande Western maintains

6

the 1600 South crossing.

7

"Question:

Was the 1600 South railroad crossing

8

inspected by you, your servants, agents, or employees at

9

any time during the ten year period preceding the collision]

10

n

Answer:

Yes.

11

"Question:

12

"Answer:

State the date of the inspection.
The 1600 South crossing is inspected on

13

a regular basis by employees of Denver & Rio Grande Western J

14

and if defects are discovered they are brought to the

15

attention of the maintenance department for correction.

16

Additional track inspections are conducted from time to timq

17

by a company named Sperry Rail Service.

18 J

"Question:

Describe in reasonable detail each and

19

every act undertaken by Denver & Rio Grande Western at

20

any time within the ten year period from April 17, 1972,

21

to April 16, 1982, for the purpose of providing for the

22

safety of highway users at the 1600 South railroad crossing,

23

"Answer:

Between April 17, 1972, and April 16, 1982

24

Denver & Rio Grande Western inspected the 1600 South

25

crossing on a regular basis to insure that the crossing was

571.
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the crossing where the railroad accident happened two years
ago with Mr. Gleave.
Do you know the crossing I am referring to?
A

I've been told it was the crossing we call the

Tin Barn Crossing.
Q

So if I use the words "Tin Barn Crossing" does

that mean something to you?
A

Yes.

Q

And where did that name come from?

A

There's a large tin barn in the area.

Q

During the ten years you were division engineer

how many times had you actually traveled over or looked at
or inspected or been at that crossing?
A

I have no idea. Many times.

Anytime you go over

the eastbound track -- and I presume you are talking about
the eastbound track?
Q

When you say "many times'1, have you been there more

than an average of once a month?
A

Oh, probably more than that.

Q

More than an average of once a week?

A

No, probably not.

Q

Somewhere between once a week and once a month for

the ten years you were division engineer.

You were somehow

at that crossing, is that fair?
A

I would go by there.

I don't know that I'd be at it

574.

j

a desired or permissible sight distance for the railroad

_

engineer to see a railroad crossing?

3
4

A

No, not that I know of.

Q

Does Denver & Rio Grande Western have any regulations

with respect to what is a permissible or desirable sight
distance for a train engineer —

locomotive engineer; that

- I is, how far a locomotive engineer should be able to see a
_ I crossing?
9
10
11

A

Not that I know of.

Q

When you're saying 'not that you know of 1 , is it

possible somebody -else knows that you don't?
A

I don't think so.

13

Q

If anyone would know you would?

14

A

I would probably know it.

12

MR. DEBRY:

15
16

A

There is another line -- 14.

"I guess."

17
18

'No' is the answer."

MR. DAVIS:

So it says:

MR. DEBRY:

Page 64.

"No is the answer,

I guess."

19

"What was the speed of -- what was the speed at

20
21

the tin barn crossing?

22

A

At what time?

23

Q

At the time of the accident.

24

A

When was the accident?

25

Q

April 16, 1982.

578.
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1

A

I believe the speed was fifty.

2

Q

Tell me the procedure under, as far as you know,

3

the procedure under which a speed limit is established.

4

What factors are taken into consideration?"

5

MR. DAVIS:

6

MR.. RICHMAN:

7

I will read the answer.

"Grade, curvature, track conditions."
MR.. DEBRY:

8
9

The pages are not in order.

Okay.

If you have got it,

Mr. Richman, do you want to finish it?
MR.. RICHMAN:

10

(Question:

11

Sure.

Reading by Mr. Debry)

"Who sets the

12

speed limit?

13

A

14

officer.

15

Q

16

establishing a speed limit?

17

A

No.

18

Q

Do you know why not?

19

A

The speed limit in that particular territory is

20

governed by centralized traffic control signals.

21

Q

What does that mean?

22

A

It means the signal tells you in advance whether

23

there is a train ahead of you or not.

24

Q

And if the lights are green you go?

25

A

That is right.

(By Mr. Richman)

"The chief of transportation

Is sight distance taken into consideration in
i
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A

Itfs passed around when it comes out just as a

matter of information.'1
MR. DEBRY:
ruling.

That is all, subject to one more

Maybe we can do it at the side bar.
(Discussion was had off the record.)
(Whereupon, further reading was done of the

deposition of Aberton.)
(Mr. Debry read the questions and Mr. Richman read
the answers as follows:)
"Question:

At the time you were division engineer

did Denver & Rio Grande Western have any rules or regulation)
or standards with respect to the safety at highway railroaG
crossings for cars?
A

No.

Q

The answer is D&RG, Denver & Rio Grande Western,

had no rules or standards or you as its division engineer
had none?
A

The railroad company does not have any.

Q

Or at least you did not have any -- or at least

did not have any at the time you were division engineer
in Utah, is that correct?
A

Correct."
MR. DEBRY:

That is all, Your Honor.

And subject to the other reservations we have made, we rest
(The plaintiff rested.)

583.

1

American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials of which Utah is a member, develops and provides

3

standards for design construction of highways, including

4

grade crossing protection.

5

Q

6

Springville meet those design criteria for railroad

7

crossings?

8

A

No, sir, it does not,

9

Q

In your opinion is the 1600 South crossing in

In your opinion does the 1600 South crossing in

10

Springville a

safe crossing for motorists?

11

A

It definitely is not.

12

Q

How would you rate that as compared to other

13

crossings?

14

A

Frankly for an eastbound driver it is by far the

15 ! worst condition of a controlled stop sign crossing I

have

16

ever seen in looking at thousands of railroad crossings.

17

Q

Would you explain why it's unsafe?

18

A

Yes, sir

19
20
21

MR. DEBRY:

May he come to the chart, Your

Honor.
THE WITNESS:

The principal reason that

22

the crossing is not safe is that with the control devices

23

that are present certain driver expectancies are provided

24

to a driver that is approaching.

25

are not met, and thus create a trap for an approaching

Van Wagoner-D

Those driver expectancies

372

driver.

The expectancy of a driver as defined in and by

the Federal Highway Administration and the American
Association of State Highway Transportation Officials ir
that if there is a hazard or a nee°d for some activity that
the driver will be made aware of that activity in sufficient
time to take avoidance action.
a stop sign.

In this case there is

The expectancy of a driver is that if they

stop at the stop sign or a stop bar associated with the
stop sign, that if they do that they will have sufficient
visibility of any potential hazard that will^allnw them
^o make the decision about proceeding, and then proceed
and clear the hazard before any conflict would develop.
That does not occur here.

And I have developed two overlays

which show two cases that will demonstrate what I am talking
about.
MR. DUNN:

Your Honor, could we proceed

by question and answer rather than narrative?

I think there)

was one objection to the statement on that last scenario
that I think could have been prevented had we not had
just an open -THE COURT:

This is direct examination.

You will need to conduct your examination by question and
answer.
Q

(By Mr. Debry)

Would you then please explain.

Would it assist you in explaining your answer to use the

Van Wagoner-D
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sight distance at the crossing so that it is sufficient to
see the hazard approaching.
Q

How do you improve sight distance?

A

There are several things that could be done.

A

very simple thing would be the removal of the weeds in
the area.

That is one thing that could be done.

There

is also a berming of earth that appears to have been left
due to construction of the railroad originally that if
that were removed would -MR. RICHMAN:

Your Honor, I object to that

last statement as being pure speculation on the part of
this witness.

that point.
Q

MR. DEBRY:

I will lay a foundation.

THE COURT:

The objection is sustained on

If you will lay a better foundation.

(By Mr. Debry)

When you visited the scene of the

accident as a professional engineer could you determine
what -- I will go back to the table —

on the table model,

which isn't here, but as the driver stops at the left there
is what we call a mound of dirt with some weeds growing
along.

I will show you an Exhibit 2A and 2B which are

basically the same thing.

As a professional engineer were

you able to form an opinion as to what formed that mound
of earth?
A

Yes, sir.
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A

Yes, sir.

Q

Would you read to the jury the excerpt on which

you relied?
A

The specific excerpt, quoting again:

,f

To emphasi

the point when motorists get the information they expect
to get from the highway and its traffic control devices
the performance tends to be rapid, appropriate, and error
free.

When they don't get what they expect or get what

they don't expect, delay, inappropriate response, error
and system failures are the usual results."
Q

In your opinion does the design of the 1600 South

crossing in Springville violate that standard of driver
expectancy?
A

It certainly does.

Q

Why?

A

Because there is a zone which I have shown on the

diagrams that if we put a train coming in that zone at
the speeds they travel there, there is certainty that a
collision will occur when a driver is acting in a prudent
way by stopping at a traffic control device and looking
down the track.

His expectancy is if he sees

nothing he

may proceed in safety, when in fact that is not true.
MR. DEBRY:

I think I am finished, Your

Honor, if I could check my notes.
That is all I have.

Van Wagoner-D
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1

ask him to read the name and address of the proposed

2

witness and then in two or three sentences tell what each

3

witness would testify if he were permitted to appear.
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I asked the people

4

in the area surrounding the location.

First of all,

\

Norma Haws^ 1412 South 500 East.

She was in a car four

7

or five years ago going east in the afternoon.

8

warm weather.

9

the window was down.

No air conditioner was on.

It was

She thinks that

She doesn't remember if the radio

10

was on.

She stopped, looked and listened.

She said we

11

have lived around the track for many years and understand

12

the dangers.

13

any distractions.

14

get out of the car, because I started to go and the train

15

was there and I was just inches from the train."

n

ThatTs what upset me because there weren?t
I was shaking so bad I couldnTt even

Sandy Smertick-)1690 South 350 East.

She is very

17

familiar with the crossing.

She lives close to that and

18

goes to stores in Spanish Fork.

19

work.

20

they were going slow.

21

day.

22

winter.

23

stopped, looked.

24

was on. Right after she was coming home from exercises

25

about 10:15 a.m.

Picks up her husband from

Two years -ago into wintertime, November or December,
It wasn't snowing.

There might have been some snow.

It was a clear

It wasnft a bad

Her sister was driving a Buick going east. She
The windows were rolled up.

The heater

She started to go. For some reason after

31.
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she stopped at the stop sign she just happened to look
again to the left and saw the train coming from the north,
and she stopped.

If she hadn't taken a second look she

would have been hit.
^iucinda 0fBrian} 1525 South 400 East #42.

She

6

goes to Spanish Fork also and has lived close by this

7

track all her life.

8

years ago.

9

were rolled up.

She was with her brother Tim a few

It was night.

She was going east.

It was kind of cold.

The windows

She came to the

10

tracks.

She doesn't think the radio was on.

She stopped,

11

looked both ways, didn't see or hear anything, so went on

12

and when she was on the tracks she saw the light.

13

wasn't very far away because she could see -- just after

14

she got across the crossing the train whizzed by behind

15

her.

16

hasn't heard the horn and also that you can't tell which

17

track the train is on because there is another track a

IS

block or so to the west or to the east.

It

She says several times she's crossed the track and

Angela'Murray7>320 East 1875 South.

The 17th or

20

18th of May she was traveling east. (Had her children)with

21

her.

22

stopping, started to go again and barely missed hitting

23

one of those orange -- those small orange cars that come

24

byc

The radio was not on.

She stopped and at the

Not a train itself, but she barely missed it.
an Mile?, 1652 South 300 East.

This Was -- okay,

32.
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1

he had his daughter with him in the car.

2

looked and started to go, then they saw the light.

3

scared them very much, and ne said he didn't hear it,

4

felt like it snuck up on him.
Nora BiraS 1749 South Main.

J.

He stopped,
It

About three or four

6

years ago she was with her husband and she was traveling

7

west at this time and stopped and looked, didn't hear

8

anything, and got just over the track and the train came

9

by.

Another time before she was married, about tea years

10

ago, she was going east aid had the same situation happen

1!

to her.
Terry Mattinsonp1245 West 1600 North.

Going east

13

two separate times approximately three years ago. They

14

were going, they stopped, didn't hear or see anything,

15

proceeded and a train came by.

16

Do you want the ones going west also?

17

We have two people who were actually injured.
y<

fT
19
20

v

•

One

« « ^

is aVsMrs. Mary McCloud7^ Her and her husband v,ere injured
very badly at the crossing.
drivingc

She stopped.

Her husband was

She stopped, listened, didn't hear anything.

21
I could give you the address.

1525 South 400 East #64.

22
Traveling east. The train came from the north.

Broke her

23
ribs, chest bone.

Her husband had cuts all over his head.

^Mr. Will Lam Rus£)also had an accident.

290 South

25
100 East in Saleti. Going east. Didn't stop. Well, he

33.

said he wasn't paying attention at the time, but the train
barely knicked his bumper.
MR. DEBRY: May the offer of proof show,
in addition to describing their own near miss, they would
each testify, if permitted, in their lay opinion it's a
dangerous intersection.
THE COURT:

The record may so show, Mr. Debry|

MR0 DEBRY: Your Honor, we had two motions
in limine.
THE COURT: Let's see -MR. DEBRY: We have a motion in limine on
the seat belt defense.
THE COURT: The Court is inclined to grant
that motion, primarily, at least to the extent that no
mention of a seat belt is to be made in opening statements
or until such time as there is some evidence in the record
to demonstrate failure to have a seat belt in this particular
case would be of any consequence.

Let me just indicate —

MR. DEBRY: Your Honor, to be specific,
we don't object to the testimony coming in that he had or
didn't have a seat belt on.

The testimony will be he

didn't have. The objection is that at this late date they
want to have a jury instruction that the jury be instructed
as a matter of law that he had a duty to have a seat belt.
If he didn't they could consider that in mitigation of

34.
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On the contrary, Knight had an express
contract with the corporation, and dealt exclusively with it in contracting to do the work,
attempting to collect his bill, and filing his
mechanics' lien. Thus, Knight did not have an
implied contract with Post. See Commercial
Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774.
Since there was no express or implied contract with Post, Knight cannot recover.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Costs awarded to Post.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. This statute reads, m relevant part, as follows:
Actions to enforce the hens herein provided for must be begun within twelve
months after the completion of the original contract .... Within the twelve
months herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file for record with the
county recorder of each county in which
the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner
provided in actions affecting the title or
right to possession of real property, or
the lien shall be void, except as to
persons who have been made parties to
the action and persons having actual
knowledge of the commencement of the
action.
2. We note that the corporation's bankruptcy action
did not necessarily preclude recovery under a properly filed mechanics' lien nor did it toll the requirement of bringing an action to enforce such a lien
within the statutory twelve month period. See Utah
Code Ann. §38-1-5 (1974); Munson v. Risinger,
114 So. 2d 59,61 (La. Ct. App. 1959).
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FOURTH DISTRICT
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen
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Robert J. DeBry for Appellant.
E. Scott Savage, Patrick J. O'Hara, Michael
F. Richman for D&RGWRR
William Bannon, Paul Watner for UDOT.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
This action arises from a collision between
an eastbound motor vehicle driven by Robert
L. Gleave and an empty southbound coal train
operated by an agent of the Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company. The
accident occurred at daylight on April 16,
1982, at the crossing of 1600 South Street in
Springviile, Utah, and the railroad tracks.
Gleave suffered severe personal injuries, and
his vehicle was demolished. He filed this personal injury action, and a jury awarded him
damages of $425,140.00 against the defendants
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company and Utah Railway Company, which
we will refer to collectively as Rio Grande.
The jury did not attribute any negligence to
Gleave. Before trial, the Utah Department of
Transportation ("UDOT") was dismissed from
the case on sovereign immunity grounds.
Rio Grande's appeal presents three substantial issues:1 (1) was Rio Grande relieved of its
duty to Gleave because regulation and control
of safety signals and devices at railroadhighway crossings is the state's "exclusive"
preempted domain? (2) was Gleave negligent
as a matter of law? and (3) did the trial court
err when it dismissed UDOT on grounds of
sovereign immunity? Gleave has crossappealed on two points: (4) did the trial court
erroneously grant Rio Grande's motion for a
directed verdict On Gleave's claim for punitive
damages? and (5) did the trial court err in
denying prejudgment interest on Gleave's
award of damages for lost future earnings and
earning capacity?
We affirm the judgment.
I. DUTY OF RAILROAD COMPANY
Rio Grande argues that "the joint jurisdiction of these state agencies [i.e., UDOT and
its reviewing agency, the Utah Public Service
Commission] over the signs and control
devices at railroad crossings remains exclusive
and a private party, such as a railroad, has no
more right to change the traffic protection
signs at a public railroad crossing, than it
would to change any other signs on a public
highway." Rio Grande's "exclusivity" conclusion is based on its interpretation of Utah
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Code Ann. §§54-4-15(2), (4) and 54-4- ment, the Bridges court cited English, adopted
15.1 (1986).2 In other words, Rio Grande the commentary, and expanded the holding:
claims it does not have any duty to the public
To authorize a jury to find neglbecause the duty has been preempted by the
igence on the part of the railroad in
state. Gleave argues that it makes no differnot taking additional precautions,
ence who had the duty to install signs and
there must be evidence to indicate
signals at the collision crossing because that
that the crossing was more than
issue was not presented to the jury and
ordinarily hazardous, i.e., there
because the jury decided that Rio Grande
must be something in the configubreached duties other than a duty to install
ration of the land, or in the constbetter signs or control devices.
ruction of the railroad, or in the
structures in the vicinity, or in the
Rio Grande's attempt to hide behind the
nature or amount of the travel on
statutes motivates us to seek further. Does not
the highway, or in other conditions,
our law impose a basic duty of reasonable care
which renders the warning empland prudence upon Rio Grande, regardless of
oyed at the crossings inadequate to
any statutory duty? We think so. In the lanwarn the public of danger.
dmark case of English v. Southern Pac« Co.,
13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47 (1896), the railway Id. at 283, 488 P.2d at 739. In a recent per
company pressed the same argument. The curiam decision of the Utah Supreme Court,
statute in question imposed upon railway this language from Bridges was quoted. Hobbs
companies the duty of ringing bells and sou- v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R R., 677 P 2d
nding whistles when trains approached public 1128, 1129 (Utah 1984). Thus, the "more than
crossings. The railroad argued that timely ordinarily hazardous" doctrine rode the legal
operation of bells and whistles was sufficient rails into railroad crossing negligence law in
and "no additional duty was imposed under Utah, and we are required to apply that doc3
any circumstances, [sic] to prevent injury." Id. trine at this time.
at 416, 45 P. at 49. Enroute to adopting the
We believe Gleave more accurately desenbes
general rule in English, the supreme court what happened at trial. The jury was specifiobserved:
cally instructed that UDOT was statutorily
[I]n some cases it has been held that
given ultimate responsibility for crossing
before a jury will be warranted in
design and warning and safety devices and
saying, in the absence of any statthat, accordingly, it could not find Rio
utory direction to that effect, that a
Grande negligent "based upon any defects
railroad company should keep a
which might exist with respect to the design of
flagman or gates at a crossing, it
the 1600 South crossing or based upon any
problems you may perceive in the lack of
must be shown that such crossing is
traffic warning devices" there. The jury promore than ordinarily hazardous....
Id. at 419, 45 P. at 50. But the court ended its ceeded to find that the crossing in this case
analysis without embracing the "more than was "more than ordinarily hazardous." Once
ordinarily hazardous" idea and held instead past that threshhold, the jury was obligated to
that the reasonable care and prudence to be decide whether Rio Grande exercised reasonused must depend upon the facts of each case. able care in driving the train across this
roadway, given the crossing's design, its
[W]hile the statutes of Utah make
physical characteristics, and the existing
some provision for the safety of the
warning signs.4
public while crossing tracks when
The statute relied upon by Rio Grande does
crossing over the public thoroughnot
relieve it of the duty to operate trains*'with
fares ..., yet these statutes will not
reasonable care, nor docs it prohibit Rio
relieve the railroad company from
Grande from exercising reasonable care in the
adopting such other
reasonable
operation of its trains and the maintenance of
measures for the public safety as
its right-of-way. Rio Grande cannot ignore
common prudence may
dictate,
the public peril at a more than ordinarily
considering the danger, locality,
hazardous crossing and excuse itself until
travel, and surrounding circumstaUDOT takes action to upgrade the safety
nces of the case.
devices at, the 1-60(1 South crossing. Rio
Id. at 420,45 P. at 50 (emphasis; added).
Grande remains subject to a standard of reaIn Bridges v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 26 Utah
sonable care which, under the circumstances at
2d 281, 488 P.2d 738 (1971), plaintiffs focused
this crossing, could require actions to reduce
on the English commentary. ;md argued that
the risks imposed on the public.
the railroad company was negligent because
Two experts testified that conditions at this
the crossing was "more than ordinarily hazacrossing made it extraordinarily dangerous.
rdous" and the company knew it but failed to
Due to the crossing angle, a mound of earth,
install adequate signals to warn the public of
vegetation, and a curving track, a driver prodanger. Apparently intrigued by that arguceeding east on the road could see only 285'
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co's AnnoUtlon Service
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of track to the north when stopped at the
existing stop sign. Rio Grande admitted before
trial that the train that hit Gleave's car was
travelling at 50 mph, the speed limit set by the
railroad. A driver with the front end of his car
even with the stop sign could not see a train
moving at 50 mph (approximately 74* per
second) until it was 4 seconds away from the
crossing. Moreover, an audiologist testified |
that a train whistle would not warn a motorist j
until about 3 seconds before the train crossed
the road. The whistle sound would be absorbed by the mound of earth and vegetation in
the curvature of the track.
Rio Grande did install a stop sign to supplement the round yellow railroad crossing sign
and the X-shaped crossbuck. But Rio Grande
did not introduce evidence of other affirmative
action to reduce the risks at this crossing, such
as straightening the track, lowering the dirt
mound, removing obstructive vegetation, or
lowering train speed. The; jury could thus
reasonably find that Rio Grande, breached its
duty of reasonable care and was, therefore,
negligent toward Gleave.
n . EVIDENCE OF GLEAVE'S LACK OF
NEGLIGENCE
In its special verdict, the jury specifically
found no negligence on the part of Gleave.
Rio Grande filed a motion for a new trial
under Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6), claiming that
the evidence was insufficient to support this
part of the verdict.
On appeal, the trial court's denial of Rio
Grande's motion must be sustained if there is
an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision.
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah
1982). Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, we will reverse the
court's ruling only if "the evidence to support
the verdict was completely lacking or was so
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict
plainly unreasonable and unjust." Id. (quoting
McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah
1977)).
Gleave testified that he pulled up to the stop
sign and stopped his vehicle. He then looked
to the left (north) and saw a dirt mound with
weeds on it and 50-100' of track but no train
approaching; then he looked to the right
(south), where he saw no train in his unobstructed view three hundred yards down the
track. Making his decision to proceed while
still looking southward, he began moving his
vehicle forward slowly and glanced back to the
left, seeing the tram rapidly bearing down on
him and hearing its whistle for the first time.
At that point in time, which Gleave estimated
was 2-3 seconds before impact, Gleave testified his car was 3-4' from the track. Deciding he could not cross the tracks safely in
light of the train's speed, Gleave braked. But
by the time the car stopped, it was approximately F from the track. Although he then
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tried to put the car in reverse, he was hit by
the train before he succeeded in shifting gears
because the train engine overhangs the track
by considerably more than twelve inches.
Van Wagoner, an engineer who evaluates
railroad crossing designs, testified that the one
at 1600 South in Springville is the worst out of
thousands of crossings he had seen that were
controlled with stop signs. According to Van
Wagoner, the stop sign creates an expectancy
in drivers that, if they stop there, they will
have sufficient visibility. of any hazard to
allow them to make a decision about proceeding and sufficient time to then proceed and
clear the hazard. That expectancy is not met at
the subject crossing because a driver stopped
at the stop sign, who does not know the
train's actual speed, can only see 285' up the
track to the north. If the driver sees no train
coming from that direction, the decision is
made to proceed while continuing to be watchful for approaching trains. However, it
takes a few seconds to react and make this
decision, a few more for the car to accelerate,
and a few more to mov« the car over the
tracks and [completely out of danger. According to Van Wagoner, this process takes 9.1
seconds from the stop sign, based on conditions at this crossing. Such a driver is 100
percent certain to be hit by a train moving at
50 mph (approximately 74' per second) if the
train is fewer than 670' away from the crossing when the 9.1 second process begins. Even
if the driver could cross the tracks in only 8
seconds, collision would be inevitable if the 50
mph train was any closer than 590' away
when the process began. The driver is trapped
because, by the time the 50 mph train is
visible, there is not enough time to continue
I and cross the tracks safely or to stop the car,
I change gears, and back up out of the train's
path.
On appeal, Gleave does not deny that he
had a duty to exercise reasonable care in
operating his vehicle over the railroad crossing; instead, he says the evidence shows he
carried out that duty.
The law requires that a traveler,
approaching a railroad crossing,
look and listen, and, if necessary,
stop to avoid being injured by
trains. This is his duty at all times
and on all occasions, whether his
view be obstructed or unobstructed,
and the greater the hazard or
danger surrounding him, the greater
is the care required of him.
Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper Co.,30 Utah
2d 262, 266, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184 (1973). Rio
Grande argues that Gleave's own testimony
shows him to be negligent as a matter of law
because he did not stop a second time at a
point where he was close enough to the track
to see further northward, but far enough from
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the track that a passing train would still clear
the front end of his car.
A plaintiff is contributorily negligent as a matter of law, if all
reasonable minds would conclude
that he failed to use the degree of
care which an ordinary, reasonable,
and prudent person would have
observed for his own safety under
the circumstances.
Id. at 266, 516 P.2d at 1185. Based on all the
evidence in the record, we hold that Gleave's
conduct was not negligent as a matter of law.
All reasonable minds would not necessarily
conclude that Gleave failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances he faced.
Van Wagoner testified that a driver who
moved his car several feet beyond the stop
sign and stopped with the front end at a spot
10* from the rail could still only see northward 285', resulting in no gain in sight distance.5 From that spot, the "reaction, decision,
acceleration, and clearance" process would still
take 8.6 seconds, resulting inevitably in a
collision with an unseen 50 mph train up to
636' away when the process began, as discussed above.
Gleave's crossing design expert, Mitchell,
stated it was possible to stop a car beyond the
stop sign and have a clear view northward
440' up the track, providing approximately 6
seconds to cross the tracks before a train
farther away than that could reach the crossing. But in this position, "very close* to the
track, a passing train would just miss the front
end of the stopped car because the train
engine is nearly 5* wider than the track.
Van Wagoner testified that a driver who
stopped with the front of his car 4* from the
track and then proceeded—upon seeing no
oncoming train-would still take approximately 7 seconds to react, decide, and move
across safely, making a collision inevitable if a
50 mph train was out of sight but fewer than
518' away when the process began.
Rio Grande's accident reconstruction
expert, Limpert, testified that it was physically
possible to stop a car at a safe point only 7'
from the rail, but he did not testify to the
length of the sight distance northward from
that point. In his testimony, Limpert forcefully challenged the validity of the assumptions
and factors used in Van Wagoner's calculations, e.g., the maximum speed possible given
the track's condition and the inclusion of
decision and reaction time in the computations. Limpert also provided his expert
opinion, illustrated by a videotape of a car
being driven over the crossing from a standstill
and from various distance away, that the
times necessary to cross safely were roughly
one-third of the estimates given by Van
Wagoner. However, it was for the jury to give
these conflicting opinions whatever weight it

deemed appropriate. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc,
667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983).
We decline to hold that, as a matter of law,
all reasonable persons would conclude
Gleave's duty at this dangerous crossing was
to inch his car forward past the established
stop sign to stop a second time in this narrow
and precarious zone which afforded no greater
degree of safety when a train approaching at
50 mph was close but still out of view. Cf.
Seybold v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 121 Utah 61,
70-71, 239 P.2d 174, 179 (1951) (plaintiff
either failed to look, looked but failed to see
what was there, or looked and failed to see the
oncoming train because blinded by lights but
proceeded anyway); Drummond v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 11 Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903, 906
(1947) (plaintiff would have had clear view of
25-30 mph train if she had stopped in a place
"which afforded her both safety and an opportunity to look").
There is substantial evidence on which a
jury could reasonably base a finding that
Gleave exercised reasonable care under the
circumstances and yet failed to see the oncoming train until it was too late to avoid the
collision. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's denial of Rio Grande's motion for a
new trial.
HI. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Gleave alleged in his complaint that UDOT
breached its statutory duty under Utah Code
Ann. §§54-4-14 through 15.1 (1986) to
install, maintain and improve safety signals
and devices at the 1600 South railroad crossing
in Springville« Although there was a yellow
warning sign, a crossbuck, and a stop sign at
this crossing, he claimed that UDOT knew or
should have known of the unreasonably dangerous condition there and that it negligently
failed to install "adequate" safety signals or
devices.
The trial court granted UDOT's motion to
dismiss the complaint based on sovereign
immunity. In so ruling, the court stated that
"the decision of whether or not to install a
safety signal at a particular crossing is a discretionary one protected by the Governmental
Immunity A c t / impliedly holding that the
allegedly negligent actions of UDOT constituted a governmental function protected by the
grant of immunity in Utah Code Ann. §6330-3(1986).
On appeal, Rio Grande makes two arguments challenging this ruling: (1) UDOT's regulation of traffic warning devices at railroad
crossings is not a "governmental, function"
within the purview of section 63-30-3* and,
therefore, UDOT.is not immune from suit;
and (2) the trial court erroneously concluded
that UDOT's failure to install different safety
devices at the subject crossing fell within the
"discretionary function" exception to the
waiver of immunity in Utah Code Annc §63-
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30-10(1) (1986).*
A. GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act
("Act") states that, "[e]xcept as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any
injury which results from the exercise of a
governmental function.../ Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-3 (1986). In Standiford v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980),
the Utah Supreme Court abandoned the
"governmental versus proprietary function"
analysis previously used in deciding whether
an entity was immune from suit for injuries
resulting from a particular activity. In doing
so, the court recognized that the Act does not
expressly or impliedly set up such a dichotomy
and that the results of the application of this
analysis had been inconsistent and unpredictable. See id. at 1232-35. The court articulated a new test and redefined a governmental
function as an activity "of such a unique
nature that it can only be performed by a,
governmental agency or that it is essential to
the core of governmental activity." Id. at
1237. Under the ne\f test, the Standiford court
concluded the' operation, of' a public golf
course is not a governmental function. Id.
The next year, in Johnson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981), the
court explained: "The first part of the Standiford test-activity of such a unique nature
that it can only be performed by a governmental agency-does not refer to what government may do, but to what government alone
must do."
The Utah Supreme Court has applied the
Standiford test numerous times, concluding
that the maintenance of traffic control devices,7
supervision of financial institutions,8 the*
issuance of motor vehicle titles and ownership
recordkeeping responsibilities,9 and supervision
of subdivision development and canal fence
construction10 are governmental functions
within the meaning of the Act. Supervision of
disbursement of escrowed funds,11 the provision of winter recreational areas on a public
golf course,12 and the operation of a sewage
system13 have been held not to be governmental functions.
UDOT is statutorily empowered to "provide
for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing,
and improving of automatic and other safety
appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings," Utah Code Ann. §54-4-15.1 (1986),
and to apportion costs of such projects among
public and private entities. Utah Code Ann.
§54-4-15.3 (1986). The government alone
must consistently regulate safety devices at
railroad crossings, determine which devices at
which crossings should be recommended for
federal funding, rank crossings in order of
need for upgrading in light of limited funds
for that purpose, and apportion signal instal-
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lation costs between public and private entities. As a practical matter, the private sector
cannot perform these functions. Accordingly,
we hold that the regulation of public safety
needs and the evaluation, installation, maintenance and improvement of safety signals or
devices at railroad crossings is a governmental
function immunized from suit under section 6330-3 of the Act.
B. DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION
In light of this holding, we must next determine whether UDOT's allegedly negligent
failure to install different safety signals at the
1600 South crossing in Springville is a
"discretionary function" within the meaning of
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(l)(a), an exception to the waiver of immunity in that statutory section:
(1) Immunity from suit of all
'governmental entities is waived for
injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the
scope of employment except if the
injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function, whether or not the discretion is abused[.]
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
this "discretionary function" exception was
"intended to shield those governmental acts
and decisions impacting on large numbers of
people in a myriad of unforeseeable ways
from individual and class legal actions, the
continual threat of which would make public
administration all but impossible." Frank v.
State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980). The
Frank court noted its prior observation, in Carroll v. State Road Comm'n, 27 Utah 2d
384, 388, 496 P.2d 888, 891 (1972), that virtually all acts require the exercise of some
degree of discretion and that the statutory
exception should thus be confined to
those decisions and acts occurring
at the "basic policy-making level/
and not extended to those acts and
decisions taking place at the operational level, or, in other words, "
... those which concern routine,
everyday matters, not requiring
evaluation of broad policy factors."
Frank, 613 P.2dat520.
More recently, in Little v. Utah State Div.
of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), the
court adopted the following test for distinguishing between functions at the policymaking level from those at the operational
level, requiring affirmative answers to four
preliminary questions in order for an act to be
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purely discretionary:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve
a basic governmental policy,
program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission,
or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that
policy, program, or objective as
opposed to one which would not
change the course or direction of
the policy, program, or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic
policy evaluation, judgment, and
expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency
involved possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful
authority and duty to do or make
the challenged act, omission, or
decision?
Id. at 51.
With regard to the case before us, the first
question presented by Little must be answered
affirmatively. The basic governmental objective involved in "installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving" safety devices is
the consistent promotion of public safety, a
basic government objective. Evaluating all of
the approximately 1,280 railroad crossings in
the state and assigning priorities for safety
signal upgrades is essential to the realization
of the protection of public safety, especially in
light of the fact that there are not unlimited
funds available to upgrade all needy crossings
at once. Thus, the second question of the Little
test must also be answered affirmatively.
UDOT exercises "basic policy evaluation,
judgment, and expertise" when evaluating
railroad crossings for safety signal improvements and when deciding which crossings
should have upgraded safety appliances first.
In applying UDOT's safety policy, UDOT's
surveillance team performs on-site inspections and weighs the numerous factors relating
to crossing safety. The team consists of transportation experts who exercise their collective
judgment and expertise in making their evaluations of the relative dangerousness of railroad crossings in Utah, taking into consideration their physical characteristics and configurations, the volume and type of vehicular
and train traffic, and other relevant factors.
Thus, the third Little question must be answered affirmatively.
Finally, Utah Code Ann. §54-4-14 et
seq. (1986) empowers UDOT with the authority to supervise and regulate the safety of all
the State's railroad crossings, including the
authority to provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of
safety devices and signals there. Utah Code
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Ann. §54-4-15.1 (1986). UDOT clearly has
the legal authority to use the monies available
for safety signal improvement at the most
dangerous crossings first, which means that
other less dangerous crossings, such as this
one, must await their turn for improvement.
Thus, the answer to the fourth Little question
is affirmative.
We therefore hold that UDOT's failure to
install different safety signals or devices at the
subject crossing was a purely discretionary
function within the meaning of section 63-3010(l)(a).
Prior Utah case law supports this conclusion. In Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2A
Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the Utah Public
Service Commission's alleged failure to
require better warning devices at a railroad
crossing involved the exercise of a discretionary function for which immunity was not
waived. The Velasquez plaintiff, a passenger
in a pickup truck hit by a train, claimed that
the state agency was liable for failing to
require additional safety devices at the crossing. Affirming summary judgment in the
agency's favor, the court concluded that the
statutory directive to the PSC to prescribe the
installation of "appropriate" safety or other
devices by the railroad company (under a prior
version of section 54-4-14) indicated a legislative intent to confer discretion on the responsible agency at the time, i.e., the Public
Service Commission:
The statute gives the respondent
[PSC] the power to require a different safety device at the crossing in
question, but that does not mean
that the plaintiff should recover
simply because a better warning
signal could or should have been
installed. The Public Service Commission has the discretion to require
the installation of such signals as in
its judgment the health or safety of
employees, passengers, customers or
the public may require.
Jd.at218,469P.2dat6.
We find no merit in Rio Grande's argument
that Velasquez has been overruled by Standiford and Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50
(Utah 1980). As previously noted, Standiford
overruled only those cases applying, the
"governmental versus proprietary function"
analysis in deciding whether or not section 6330-3 immunity applied to the allegedly injurious activity in the first place. In Velasquez,
the court did not apply the later discredited
mode of analysis; instead, it merely assumed
there was a governmental function and
focused solely on the applicability of the discretionary function exception. Similarly, in
Bigelow, the court applied the "basic policymaking level versus operational lever distin-
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ction set forth in Frank, discussed above, and
concluded that the design of the street traffic
control system did not involve decisions and
acts at the basic policy-making level and,
therefore, was not a discretionary function
within section 63-30-10(1). Bigelow, 618
P.2dat53.
However, as stated above, the allegedly
negligent omission in this case does involve
decisions and acts at the basic policy-making
level. The trial court thus correctly concluded
that UDOTs failure to install different safety
devices or signals at the 1600 South crossing in
Springville comes within the discretionary
function exception of section 63-3010(l)(a). We therefore affirm the dismissal of
the complaint against UDOT.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM
Gleave alleged that Rio Grande had knowledge of dangerous conditions at the crossing
and "willfully or recklessly failed to take any
corrective steps." At the close of Gleave's
evidence, Rio Grande moved for a directed
verdict on Gleave1 s punitive damage claim
because of insufficiency of the evidence. Rio
Grande argued that there was not one scintilla
of evidence of willful or malicious activity on
its part. Gleave agreed there was no proof of
actual malice, but argued there was sufficient
evidence of reckless conduct for the jury to
imply malice.
The trial court granted Rio Grande's
motion and withdrew the punitive damage
issue from the jury's consideration; however,
it is not clear whether that ruling was based on
inadequate evidence of actual malice or
implied malice.
In reviewing the correctness of the trial
court's grant of a directed verdict to Rio
Grande on Gleave's punitive damage claim,
we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to him, the party against whom the
motion was made. Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d
1270, 1271 (Utah 1980). If there is no evidence
to justify punitive damages, the issue was
properly withheld from the jury. Tripp v.
Bagley, 75 Utah 42, 282 P. 1026 (1929). If,
however, reasonable inferences supporting
judgment for the losing party could be drawn
from the evidence presented at trial, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. Little
America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112,
114 (Utah 1982); Kim, 610 P.2d at 1271. This
is so even if reasonable persons might reach
different conclusions on the punitive damage
issue after considering the evidence and the
reasonable inferences therefrom. See Little
America Refining Co., 641 P.2d at 114.
Before punitive damages may be awarded,
the plaintiff must prove conduct that is willful
and malicious or that manifests a knowing and
reckless indifference toward, and disregard of,
the rights of others. Atkin Wright & Miles v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d
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330, 337 (Utah 1985); Synergetics v. Marathon
Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1112-13 (Utah
1985); Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 84
(Utah App. 1987).
In our review of Rio Grande's duty of care,
we noted substantial evidence from which a
jury could reasonably conclude that Rio
Grande was negligent. But evidence of simple
negligence alone does not support an award of
punitive damages.
Punitive damages should be
awarded infrequently. Simple negligence will never suffice as a basis
upon which such damages may be
awarded. "[They] are not awarded
for mere inadvertence, mistake,
errors of judgment and the like,
which constitute ordinary negligence."
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d
1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts §908 comment b (1979)).14
In Behrens, the Utah Supreme Court identified three elements of the type of conduct
that will support an award of punitive
damages against a defendant in a negligence
action who acts "maliciously or in reckless
disregard for the rights of others." Although
actual intent to cause injury is not necessary,
the defendant must either know or
should know "that such conduct
would, [1] in a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm
to another," Danculovich v. Brown,
Wyo., 593 P.2d 187, 193 (1979),
and [2] the conduct must be "highly
unreasonable conduct, or an
extreme departure from ordinary
care, [3] in a situation where a high
degree of danger is apparent." Id.
at 191.
Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186-87 (numbering
added).
We now evaluate the evidence presented by
Gleave in light of these three elements:
(1) High degree of probability. There was
uncontroverted testimony that there had been
no accidents at this crossing up to the time of
UDOT's inspection and evaluation in 1974.
After that time, Rio Grande installed stop
signs as a temporary measure until UDOT
upgraded the crossing with flashing red lights.
Gleave's attorney claimed he would offer
evidence at trial of "near misses" at the crossing, but none was produced. The locality was
rural, and the road not heavily travelled.
There is no evidence that Rio Grande knew or
should have known of the facts discovered by
Gleave's experts after this accident. In any
event, the evidence shows a low degree of
probability.
(2) Highly unreasonable conduct or extreme
departure from ordinary care. At worst, the
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evidence shows errors of judgment, i.e., ordinary negligence on the part of Rio Grande, in
failing to take steps to reduce the risks at this
crossing. There is no evidence of an extreme
departure from ordinary care.
(3) High degree of danger apparent. A
degree of danger exists at every railroad crossing. The evidence showed the degree of
danger at this crossing was high. The crossing
was more than ordinarily hazardous. But, was
the extent of that danger readily apparent
prior to this accident? Perhaps reasonable
minds couid differ concerning this prong of
the Behrens test, but the first two prongs
remain unsatisfied.
Moreover, the general rule is that only
compensatory damages are appropriate and
that punitive damages may be awarded only in
exceptional cases. Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186.
The evidence shows nothing exceptional about
Rio Grande's conduct in this case.
Furthermore, punitive damages
should be awarded only when they
will clearly accomplish a public
objective not accomplished by the
award of compensatory damages
.... The intended deterrent effect
must be clear and in proportion to
the nature of the wrong and the
possibility of recurrence.
Id. at 1187. Gleave has not directed our attention to any public objective which would
clearly be accomplished by an award of punitive damages hereinc Where the wrong is the
result of simple negligence, there is nothing to
deter. We believe the substantial compensatory
award will provide ample motivation for Rio
Grande to take appropriate measures to
protect the public and itself from a recurrence
of this unfortunate accident.
There is no evidence of malice, actual or
implied, that would justify an award of punitive damages against Rio Grande. The trial
court thus properly withheld that issue from
the jury.
V. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
In the special verdict returned in this case,
the jury awarded Gleave the following itemized damages:
A. Past medical expenses
$56,000
Be Future medical expenses
$22,540
C. Past lost wages
$20,000
D. Loss of future earnings
and earning capacity
$275,000
E. General Damages
$50,000
F. Market value of Gleave
vehicle
$1,600
Total
$425,140
The trial court granted Gleave's post-trial
motion to amend his complaint to include a
claim for prejudgment interest on items A, C,
and D, under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-44
(1987). Gleave's request for prejudgment int-
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erest on items A and C was granted, but the
court denied prejudgment interest on item D.
It is true, as Gleave asserts, that lost future
earning capacity is a special damage insofar as
pleading requirements are concerned. Cohn v.
J. C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah
1975). But we must still decide whether section
78-27-44 authorizes prejudgment interest on
all types of special damages, whether they
arise before or after entry of a plaintiff's
personal injury judgment.
In construing this legislation, we must give
effect to the legislature's underlying intent,
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1,
3 (Utah 1984), and assume that each term in
the statute was used advisedly. West Jordan v.
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). We
will interpret and apply the statute according
to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably
confused or inoperable. Id.; Home v. Home,
737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App. 1987). A proper
construction of its terms must further the
statute's purposes. RDG
Assocs./Jorman
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 741 P.2d 948,
951 (Utah 1987).
The statute provides:
In all actions brought to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained by any person, resulting from
or occasioned by the tort of any
other person, corporation, association or partnership, whether by
negligence or willful intent of that
other person, corporation, association or partnership, and whether
that injury shall have resulted
fatally or otherwise, it shall be
lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the
special damages alleged from the
date of the occurrence of the act
giving rise to the cause of action
and it shall be the duty of the
court, in entering judgment for
plaintiff in that action, to add to
the amount of damages assessed by
the verdict of the jury ... interest on
that amount calculated at 8% per'
annum from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the
cause of action to the date of entering the judgment, and to include
it in that judgment.
Utah Code A n n . § 7 8 - 2 7 - 4 4 (1987)
(emphasis added). We agree with Rio Grande
that this emphasized phrase clearly modifies
"special damages/ limiting those special
damages on which prejudgment interest is
recoverable to those that arise in the period
between the act giving rise to the cause of
action and entry of judgment in plaintiffs
favor.
This interpretation of the statute furthers its
purpose, as documented in its legislative

For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co's Annotation Service
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history. When first introduced at the 1975
Legislature by Senator Renstrom as Senate Bill
153 and later passed by the Senate, the word
"special" was not in the proposed statute;
prejudgment interest was to be awarded a
successful plaintiff on all "damages alleged
from the date of the occurrence of the act
...." Utah Senate Tr. of 3rd Reading of S.B.
153, February 20,1975.
At the bill's second and third reading in the
House of Representatives, however, there was
a lengthy discussion of the problems with such
a broad prejudgment interest provision. Utah
House of Reps. Tr. of 2nd and 3rd Reading of
S.B. 153, March 13, 1975. Some legislators
voiced their concerns about accrual of interest
on damages in a malpractice action where the
cause of action did not even accrue until discovery of the injury, possibly many years after
the date the injurious act occurred. A similar
concern was voiced regarding injured minors
who waited until after reaching majority age
before bringing their lawsuits; under the proposed statute, interest could accrue for many
years. Others feared the effect such a law
would have on doctors' malpractice insurance
rates and on all casualty insurance premiums
in the state.
Toward the end of the House debate, Representative Fisher offered an amendment to
add the word "special* before the word
"damages" in the bill, explaining that special
damages are the expenses paid for those who
are injured so they can immediately receive
necessary medical and hospital care. He added
that special damages are
those expenses that they have paid
out of pocket, for which they have
used their own money and which
they will not get until the settlement
of their action. Getting interest on
their out-of-pocket expenses will
provide a total recoupment of any
expenses that they have had from
the time of the accident until they
are paid in full by a recovery at
court or by settlement. I believe it's
a reasonable and a very logical
amendment that interest on special
damages be endorsed by us, and in
that form we will pass the intent of
the bill of paying for all expenses
until such time as judgment is rendered, and we will not be assessing
an interest on something that
neither of the parties know.
Id. (emphasis added). In its amended form,
Senate Bill 153 then passed in the House by
five votes. When the amended bill was returned to the Senate later the same day, Senator
Renstrom made a motion that the Senate
concur in the House amendment. After that
motion passed, the amended bill passed the
Senate with no further discussion. Utah Senate
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Tr. of Vote on S.B. 153, March 13,1975.
The legislative history and the statutory
language reveal the legislature's intent to distinguish between special damages accruing
between the date of the injurious act and the
entry of judgment (such as medical expenses
or lost wages) and those (such as lost future
earnings and future earning capacity) that will
arise subsequent to entry of judgment, and to
authorize prejudgment interest only on the
former category of special damages.15 The trial
court thus properly denied Gleave prejudgment interest under section 78-27-44 on that
portion of damages in the special jury verdict
designated as "lost future earnings and earning
capacity."
CONCLUSION
We have considered the other issues raised
by Rio Grande and find them meritless. The
judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs
are awarded only to UDOT.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Russell W. Bench, Judge
1. Rio Grande also claimed it was entitled to have
the jury instructed that it could reduce Gleave's
damages if it found that he failed to mitigate his
damages by not wearing a seat belt. That issue was
recently resolved adversely to Rio Grande's position
in Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 303-04 (Utah
App. 1987).
2. Utah Code Ann. §54-4-15(2) and (4) (1986)
provide:
(2) The department shall have the
power to determine and prescribe the
manner, including the particular point
of crossing, and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and
protection ... of each crossing of a
public road or highway by a railroad or
street railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or
abolish any such crossing, to restrict the
use of such crossings to certain types of
traffic in the interest of public safety ....
(4) The commission shall retain exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of
any dispute upon petition by any person
aggrieved by any action of the department pursuant to this section.
Utah Code Ann. §54-4-15.1 (1986) provides:
The Department of Transportation so
as to promote the public safety shall as
prescribed in this act provide for the
installing, maintaining, reconstructing,
and improving of automatic and other
safety appliances, signals or devices at
grade crossings on public highways or
roads over the tracks of any railroad or
street railroad corporation in the state.

For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code^Cos Annotation Service
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3. Although this doctrine is unnecessary and confusing, it makes no difference in the present case. See
the unpublished opinion of U. S. District Judge
Bruce A. Jenkins in Wilde v. Denver & Rio Grande
W. R.R. Co., No. C-83-149J, slip op. at 16 (D.
Ut. April 3,1985):
In conclusion, the court would be
remiss if it did not express its criticism
of the doctrine of the "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. The Utah
Supreme Court should, at its first opportunity, examine the doctrine with an
eye to eliminating it. The court believes
that instructing a fact finder that it
cannot find a railroad negligent for
operating a train through a crossing
without taking additional precautions
unless it first finds that the warnings at
the crossing were inadequate to warn the
public adds nothing—except perhaps
confusion-to an instruction that the
railroad has a duty to operate its trains
with reasonable care, [f the warnings are
adequate, a jury would find that a reasonable person would not add additional
warnings. A special doctrine is not necessary.

[RJights and duties of a traveler and of
a railroad company at crossings are
mutual and reciprocal .... [AJ railroad
company, merely because it is the
favored traffic, [may not] carelessly and
heedlessly operate its trains over crossings at an unusual and excessive speed
and without giving adequate warnings,
or create a misleading set of circumstances and rely upon the assumption that
the traveling public may look out for
their safety and keep out of the way of
the trains.
Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 121 Utah
37, 58-59, 239 P.2d 163, 173 (1951).
5. We note that Utah law requires a driver approaching a railroad crossing to stop "within fifty feet but
not less than ten feet from the nearest track of
such railroad" when an approaching train "is plainly
visible and is in hazardous proximity to such crossing." Utah Code Ann. §41-6-95(a)(4) (1982)
(emphasis added).
6. In his cross-appeal, Gleave did not challenge the
trial court's dismissal of UDOT. Rio Grande, in
both its opposition to UDOT's pretrial motion to
dismiss and in its appeal to this court, has not contended that Gleave's injury was caused by UDOT's
creation of a dangerous condition on a road, for
which immunity is expressly waived in Utah Code
Ann. §63-30-8 (1986). This separate waiver
provision is not subject to the "discretionary function" exception in section 63-30-10(1). Sanford v.
University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741,
745 (1971). See Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276,
278 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Bigelow v. Ingersoll,
618 P.2d 50, 54 n.3 (Utah 1980).
7. Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985)
(per curiam).
8. Afadsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
9. Metropolitan Fin. Co. v. State, 714 P.2d 293
(Utah 1986) (per curiam).

Provo, Utah

10. Loveland v. Orcm City Corp., 70 Utah Adv.
Rep. 2 (1987).
11. Cox v. Utah Mortg. & Loan Co., 716 P.2d 783
(Utah 1986).
12. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432
(Utah 1981).
13. Dalton v. Salt Lake Sub. San. Dist., 676 P.2d
399 (Utah 1984); Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642
P.2d 737 (Utah 1982).
14. We note that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§908 (1979) states:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other
than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person to punish him
for his outrageous conduct and to deter
him and others like him from similar
conduct in the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded
for conduct that is outrageous, because
of the defendant's evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of
others....
15. The latter type is, of course, subject to the statutory interest rate on judgments in Utah Code
Ann. §15-1-4(1986).
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OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
This litigation arose from real estate transactions involving the Green River Motel.
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Pursuant to Rule 45(c) Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, Gleave moves this Court for an order extending the
time for filing his Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
On February 22, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied
Gleave's Petition for Reconsideration, (Exhibit "A").
the time

for

filing the Petition

for Writ

of

Thus,

Certiorari

would run on March 23, 1988.
However,
(Exhibit "B").

Gleave

has

filed

a

subsequent

motion

It is not clear from the rules whether this

subsequent motion will toll the time for filing the Petition
for Writ

of

Certiorari.

(See

Rule

45(c)

Rules

of

Utah

Supreme Court.)
Therefore, Gleave moves for an order extending the
time for filing the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 30 days
front

any

ruling

plaintiff's

of

the

Utah

pending motion

Court

(Exhibit

of

Appeals

denying

"B") or to April 21,

1988, whichever is earlier.
DATED this Jjjih

day of March, 1988.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By

y'c~&, ~J-/// ^n
ROBERT J./tEBRY

ORDER

For good cause shown, it is hereby ordered that the
time for Gleave to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
extended from March 23, 1988 to ~5Q days after any denial of
the Court of Appeals of Gleave's pending motion (Exhibit
"B"), or to April -2£, 1988, whichever is earlier.
DATED this /f^

day of

/ ^ ^ ^

, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

r r r *^ <^ r-^*cL

fONORASLH JUSTICE OF THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT
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Y

(Gleave v. Rio Grande, et al.) postage
of

March, 1988, to the following:

E. Scott Savage, Esq.
Michael F. Richman, Esq.
Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq.
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Rio Grande and Utah Railway Company
P.O. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400

Paul M. Warner, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utah
Department of Transportation, State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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Robert J. Debry
Attorney at Law
Robert J. Debry & Associates
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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In Re:
Robert L. Gleave,
Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
v.
Court of Appeals No. 350057-CA
Denver & Rio Grande Western
and No. 860C53-CA
Railroad Company, a Utah corporation,
Utah Railway Company, a corporation,
Defendants and Appellants,
and Cross-Respondents,
and
State of Utah, Department of
Transportation,
Defendant and Respondent.
Upon consideration of the appellant's petition for
rehearing heretofore filed herein, and the arguments of
counsel thereupon had, it is ordered that the rehearing
is denied.
Sincerely,

Janice Hill
Case Manager
encl
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Robert L. Gleave,
Plaintiff and Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

V.

Denver St Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, a corporation, and Utah Railway Company,
a corporation,

No. 860057-CA
No. 860058-CA

Defendants and Appellants
and Cross-Respondents,
and
State of Utah, Department of
Transportation,
Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Bench, Jackson and Garff.

Plaintiff Glea ve filed with this court a petition for
reconsideration of ,whether the trial court erred in granting
Defendant Rio Grand ees motion for directed verdict on Gleave's
punitive damage cla im. In support of his petition, Gleave
correctly asserts t hat, in evaluating the evidence on this
point, we took into consideration the absence of any evidence
of near-misses at t he subject railroad crossing. However, he
indicates in his pe tition--for the first time—that his
near-miss and prior accident evidence was excluded in a
pre-trial ruling, Because Gleave did not raise in his
cross-appeal the is sue of whether the court erroneously
excluded his proffe red near-raiss and prior accident evidence,
we have not and wil 1 not address the issue.

Reviewing the correctness of the directed verdict in
light of the evidence actually presented and admitted at
trial, we adhere to the conclusion in our January 28, 1988
opinion that the trial court properly withheld the issue of
punitive damages from the jury because there was no evidence
in the record of actual or implied malice on the part of Rio
Grande.
Gleave's petition for reconsideration is, therefore,
denied.
FOR THE COURT:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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Robert J. DeBry, Esq.
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Michael R. Richman, Esq.
Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
Faul M. Warner, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utah
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Pursuant to Rule 2 of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals 1 , Gleave moves this Court to suspend Rule 35(d)
for the purpose of reconsidering its Order of February 22,
1988.2

The grounds for this motion are as follows:
1.

At trial, Gleave offered evidence of

misses" as well as two prior accidents.

"near

The evidence was

refused by the Court.

However, Gleave preserved an offer of

proof.

clearly

The

evidence

should

have

been

received.

Robinson v. Seaboard R.R., Inc., 361 S.E. 2d 909 (N.C. App.
1987) .
2.

During

the

briefing

of

the

case,

neither

party referred to the proffered evidence of "near misses."
Rather,

both

parties

relied

upon

other

evidence

in

the

record.

lM

In the interest of expediting a decision, the Court
of Appeals . . . may . . . suspend the requirements or
provisions of any of these rules. . . "
2

Rule 35(d) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals
states, ".
. consecutive petitions for rehearing will not
be received by the clerk." Technically, this is an initial
motion to reconsider the Order of February 22, 1988.
However, the Court might construe this to be a "consecutive
petition" or second petition to reconsider the opinion of
January 28, 1988. The Court would be required to act under
Rule 2 (to suspend Rule 35(d)) in order to consider this
petition.
-2-

3.
the

issues

The Court's analysis of this case went beyond
raised

in

the

briefs.

Thus,

this

Court

sua

sponte searched the record with respect to "near misses."
The opinion of this Court states:
Gleave's attorney claimed he would offer
evidence at trial of "near misses" at
the crossing, but none was produced.
(Slip Opinion at p. 19.)
4.
Gleave

Gleave filed a Petition for Reconsideration.

argued, inter alia, that the Court had

overlooked

plaintiff's offer of proof regarding "near misses" and prior
accidents.
5.
1988)

denying

This
the

Court

entered

Petition

for

an

Order

(February

Reconsideration.

22,
With

respect to the "near misses," this Court stated:
Because Gleave did not raise in his
cross-appeal the issue of whether the
Court erroneously excluded his proffered
near-miss and prior accident evidence,
we have not and will not address the
issue.
Reviewing the correctness of the directed verdict in light of the evidence
actually presented^ and admitted at
trial, we adhere to the conclusion in
our January
28, 1988, opinion. . .

^This Court erroneously believed that this evidence was
excluded in a pre-trial ruling. (See Order February 22,
1988.) In fact, plaintiff's offer of proof and the Court's
ruling came during the trial. R. 1683-1686.)
-3-

6.

It is respectfully submitted that this Court's

Order of February 22, 1988, erred as a matter of law.

The

correct law is as follows:
We hold the trial court erred in
dismissing plaintiff's action . . .
In
passing on this assignment of error,
evidence erroneously excluded is to be
considered with other evidence offered
by plaintiffs.
Woodward v. Pressley,
249 S.E. 2d 471 (N.C. App. 1978.)
•

*

*

In considering whether the trial court
should
have
sustained
defendant's
motions
for directed verdicts, this
court will look to all the competent
evidence, including facts which were
shown by proof but which were withdrawn
from the jury by the trial judge,
especially
where
such
evidence
was
improperly withdrawn, as we think was
true in this case. Beene v. Cook, 311
S.W. 2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1957).

In passing on the sufficiency of the
evidence,
we
have
considered
that
offered by plaintiff and
improperly
excluded by the court. Smith v. J.C.
Penny Co., 149 N.W. 2d 794 (Iowa 1967).
7.

This

Court's

Order

of

February

22, 1988,

chides plaintiff for not raising the issue of "near misses"
until the Petition
Gleave's

for Reconsideration.

right -- and Gleave's

risk

It was certainly

-- to rely on other

evidence, and to ignore the "near misses" evidence.
-4-

This

court, likewise, had every right to ignore the "near miss"
evidence, since it was not raised in the briefs.
However, this Court chose to search the record and
to raise

the

issue of

"near misses" sua

sponte.

Gieave

concedes that the Court has power to search the record and
raise issues sua sponte.

(See e.g. Swenson v. Thibaut, 250

S.E. 2d 279, 293 (N.C. 1978).

However, having raised the

issue, the Court must resolve it!

Here the Court raised an

issue sua sponte, but the Court did not resolve it.
after

raising

the

issue,

the

Court

erroneous ruling of the trial court.

relied

on

Rather,

a clearly

That was an error of

law and an abdication of appellate jurisdiction.
8.
Order

of

In summary, this Court

February

22,

1988,

and

should withdraw its
thereby

proceed

to

reconsider the opinion of January 28, 1983.
DATED this

y

day of March, 1988.
ROBERT J- DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Plaintiff Gleave filed with this court a petition for
reconsideration of whether the trial court erred in granting
Defendant Rio Grande's motion for directed verdict on Gleave'<
punitive damage claim. In support of his petition, Gleave
correctly asserts that, in evaluating the evidence on this
point, we took into consideration the absence of any evidence
of near-misses at the subject railroad crossing. However, he
indicates in his petition—for the first time—that his
near-miss and prior accident evidence was excluded in a
pre-trial ruling. Because Gleave did not raise in his
cross-appeal the issue of whether the court erroneously
excluded his proffered near-miss and prior accident evidence,
we have not and will not address the issue.

Reviewing the correctness of the directed verdict in
light of the evidence actually presented and admitted at
trial, we adhere to the conclusion in our January 28, 1988
opinion that the trial court properly withheld the issue of
punitive damages from the jury because there was no evidence
in the record of actual or implied malice on the part of Rio
Grande.
Gleave's petition for reconsideration is, therefore,
denied.
FOR THE COURT:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

